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young children was in order. The Johnson family duly motored to Narooma, about 150 miles southeast of
Canberra, for what they expected to be a three-week holiday during the peak of the Australian summer. They
chose the spot for its beauty—and because the children would be able to swim without worrying about
sharks.The Johnsons’ holiday was cut short on January 8, when wire copy began circulating in Australia with
unexpected and unwelcome news. Johnson was to be replaced as minister by a political confidant of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt—Democratic National Committee Chairman Edward J. Flynn of New York. Not only
would Flynn succeed Johnson in Canberra, he would be given an upgraded title—Ambassador
Plenipotentiary—and expanded duties as a “roving Ambassador” in the South Pacific. He would also get
nearly twice the salary Johnson was making. ( Johnson was paid $10,000 a year; Flynn’s salary would be
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The Battle FDR Lost: The Failed
Nomination of Boss Ed Flyn n as
Min ister to Australia
Michael J. Birkner

S

hortly after Christmas in 1942, the U.S. minister to
Australia, Nelson Trusler Johnson, decided the time
was right for a break from his wartime duties. Johnson
and his wife, Jane, agreed that a seaside vacation with
their young children was in order. The Johnson family
duly motored to Narooma, about 150 miles southeast of
Canberra, for what they expected to be a three-week holiday
during the peak of the Australian summer. They chose the
spot for its beauty—and because the children would be able
to swim without worrying about sharks.1 The Johnsons’
holiday was cut short on January 8, when wire copy began
circulating in Australia with unexpected and unwelcome
news. Johnson was to be replaced as minister by a political
confidant of President Franklin D. Roosevelt—Democratic
National Committee Chairman Edward J. Flynn of New
York. Not only would Flynn succeed Johnson in Canberra,
he would be given an upgraded title—Ambassador
Plenipotentiary—and expanded duties as a “roving
Ambassador” in the South Pacific. He would also get nearly
twice the salary Johnson was making. (Johnson was paid
$10,000 a year; Flynn’s salary would be $17,000.)
Contrary to protocol, the well-known Boss of the Bronx
announced his own appointment prior to any formal news
release from the White House.2 Two days would pass before
President Roosevelt’s spokesman, Stephen Early, made it
official: Johnson, Early said, had requested recall and put
in retirement papers; Ed Flynn was the president’s choice
to succeed him in this important theater of the war.3 The
fact that Johnson had not asked to be replaced and had
not intended to retire while the war was in progress was
known only to the minister, his wife, and a few baffled
State Department officials. The appointment had not gone
through the regular channels, nor had the president’s
choice been vetted by the secretary of state.
In an instant Nelson Johnson’s life was turned upside
down. Little did Ed Flynn know it when he made his
announcement, but his appointment was to bring him more
grief than glory. Moreover, the president whom he had long
served as a trusted political adviser would be seriously
embarrassed by the headlines generated in course of the
confirmation process and by its unlikely outcome.
As soon as news of Flynn’s nomination reached him in
Narooma, Nelson Johnson packed up his belongings and
returned to Canberra to begin the process of closing out his
affairs. He did not hide his disappointment from friends,
nor from his associates in the diplomatic corps. As Johnson
pointed out to a number of people, including Stanley
Hornbeck, then assistant secretary of state for Asian affairs,
he did not want to leave Australia while the war continued.
He was annoyed that this was how the administration spun
the issue. However, if retirement or reassignment was the
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president’s wish, he would return to Washington as soon as
his successor was confirmed by the Senate.4
No one in the Australian government knew what
to make of the president’s decision to replace the hardworking and popular minister. In private, reactions to the
Flynn appointment among Australian officials ranged from
resignation to anger. Notes of appreciation sent to Johnson
by leading figures in the Australian government, among
them Prime Minister John Curtin, former Prime Minister
William (“Billy”) Hughes, and Labor Party stalwart Arthur
A. Calwell, made him feel he had accomplished something,
but they also reminded him that his job was not yet fully
done. Noting his “profound regret” that Johnson was going
to leave Australia, Calwell observed that “in our hour of
greatest danger from invasion you were Australia’s first
and one of its greatest friends.” No stranger to hyperbole,
Calwell went on to say that “but for you and General
Macarthur [sic] we might easily today be a Japanese
Colony—a fate too terrible almost to contemplate.”5 Prime
Minister Curtin could barely restrain his irritation with the
president’s decision to name a political crony in Johnson’s
place. According to the editors of Curtin’s backroom
briefings, Curtin’s comments to the Australian press about
the replacement of a well-respected minister with a partisan
wirepuller were “etched in incredulous contempt.”6
Private expressions of support for Johnson from within
government circles were one thing, but there would be
no official protest from Canberra. Given the Australian
government’s dependence on American support in its hour
of peril, there was no choice but to accept the president’s
decision. Curtin acknowledged this in his backroom press
briefings.7 As an American observer, John Holland, put it,
“Australia . . . dare not say anything openly for in her
desperate military plight she can not afford to question any
act of [the] U.S.A., no matter how unprincipled.”8
Trained to accept things beyond his control, Johnson
intended to maintain a dignified silence on the controversy
swirling about him. No public protest would emanate from
his lips. As he told his friend Hornbeck, he would be a “good
soldier” and “let nature take its course.”9 Nature’s course,
however, proved to be anything but smooth for Ed Flynn’s
ambassadorial ambitions. Commentators suggested that the
nomination would not be cut and dried, owing to question
marks about Flynn’s qualifications for the position and
recent charges, made by the Scripps-Howard newspapers
that Flynn had ordered Bronx County public works crews
to install 8,000 Belgian paving blocks in the driveway of
his upstate New York vacation home. Seemingly a faux
scandal that Flynn had brushed off successfully through
two grand jury investigations, those paving blocks would
prove to be the single most potent argument against Flynn,
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and certainly the easiest for an interested public to grasp.10
Why had FDR nominated Flynn in the first place? The
question begs for an answer. Flynn’s explanation was that
Roosevelt wanted a person who got along well with others
to manage an important diplomatic relationship. The fact
that Flynn was friendly to organized labor—and that his
ethnic heritage was Irish—would presumably help him in
the work he was going to be doing in Canberra. Moreover,
Flynn claimed, the president told him he “needed someone
whom he could trust implicitly for this wartime post.”11
The official explanation for the appointment was
terse: this was the president’s choice, Stephen Early had
noted, and Flynn was qualified for the post. Privately, FDR
told an old friend, the Rev. Anson Phelps Stokes, that he
needed something other than a “very old and experienced”
diplomat in Canberra. (Johnson was surely experienced,
having been a member of the foreign service since 1907; but
at age 56, he was hardly “very old.” Indeed, he was five years
younger than the president.) “What I need [is] a practical
politician, thoroughly familiar with and acceptable to labor
circles and, if possible, an Irishman because of the fact that
nearly half of Australia is Irish in descent.”12
There may have been some truth in that, but FDR’s
remark to Stokes seems more rationalization than rationale.
Syndicated columnist Ernest Lindley may have come closer
to the point when he observed that Flynn had stood by
Roosevelt through “thick and thin” in the political wars.
That was reason enough for his appointment, said Lindley.
Another columnist, Gould Lincoln, offered a variation on
this theme. He suggested that Roosevelt—ever the canny
political operator—wanted someone he could trust to
“keep an eye” on General Douglas MacArthur, a potential
challenger for the presidency in 1944. David Lawrence
of U.S. News and World Report said Roosevelt was simply
paying off a political debt to Flynn, who had engineered
FDR’s third-term victory in 1940 and remained a key
political adviser. His appointment, said Lawrence, was
“an unfortunate mistake,” given that Australia was “in the
active theater of war” and relations with its leaders should
not be put in the hands of “a politician.”13
Other observers were more sardonic in their response
to this evident political payoff. Syndicated columnist
George Sokolsky asserted that Flynn’s incompetence at
the Democratic National Committee was the real reason
for FDR’s move. Scripps-Howard press syndicate chief
Roy Howard, a burr in Flynn’s saddle for more than a
decade, suggested that the Bronx boss’s qualifications for
the Australian post were “about equal to my qualifications
for being Pope or for fulfilling the functions of the Dalai
Lama.”14
It would have been difficult to sustain the argument that
Flynn was an incompetent politician. He had done yeoman
work for Roosevelt for nearly two decades, most especially
in securing the president’s third-term nomination against
a backdrop of public ambivalence about breaking the twoterm tradition. Flynn would exert himself usefully for the
president in 1944 and for President Harry Truman in 1948.
But being a canny politician cut two ways. All observers
recognized that this appointment represented first and
foremost the payment of a political debt the president owed
to Flynn. As matters unfolded, it became more evident that
Roosevelt was not the engine behind the appointment;
Flynn was.
How can one draw that conclusion? By 1942 Flynn
was increasingly the target of sniping from the media
and fellow politicians, and he was tiring of the political
game. He wanted to burnish his resume before returning
to private law practice. Only months before the Australian
appointment was announced Flynn had pressed Roosevelt
for an appointment as ambassador to Mexico. That proved
an impossible gift for Roosevelt to make. Australia seemed
right, both to the ambitious boss and the grateful and
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increasingly weary president.15 In this instance, Roosevelt’s
normally acute instincts proved fallible.
There may never have been a nomination that received
worse press than Flynn’s. Editorial writers for every New
York newspaper, including the normally pro-Roosevelt
New York Times, castigated the nomination of a native New
Yorker.16 The chorus was taken up across the country, with
even reliably Democratic newspapers expressing their
surprise, chagrin, or anger that the nomination had been
made. An editorial writer in the San Francisco Chronicle, for
example, suggested that FDR had appointed Flynn as a
way to “get rid” of him as Democratic National Committee
chairman. The Nashville Banner wrote that the appointment
“offends Australia. It sickens America. Why, then make
it.”17 One writer suggested that if Flynn were “eligible”
for the Australian post, then “why not choose boss Eddie
Kelly of Chicago as Envoy Extraordinary to China and
issue to Boss Frankie Hague of Jersey City Plenipotentiary
credentials to the Court of Saint James?” The nomination
was “revolting to all decent citizens,” Edith Harmon of
Palo Alto, California, told the president. A disappointed
Democrat chastised the president: “How could you do it?
Why make it so hard for us who are doing all we can to
back you up?” Helen Clymer wrote from New York City to
ask, “Why victimize Australia?”18
Private correspondence addressed to the president,
like Harmon’s and Clymer’s, was surprisingly negative and
often caustic, with the most prominent metaphor relating
to the “stink” of it. The “stink” motif featured prominently
in editorial cartoons as well.19 The upshot of the sour
reaction to the nomination was readily apparent: the
Flynn nomination provided an opening for Republicans—
until the 1942 elections largely helpless to block New
Deal measures—to attack the administration. With the
Republican contingent substantially increased in Congress
as it commenced business in January 1943, GOP leaders
sensed an opportunity to bloody the president’s nose. The
Flynn nomination offered an ideal test case.
Three days after the president officially nominated
Flynn, Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) said he would
fight to block the nomination, which he called “an insult
to Australia” and “the most despicable yet made by the
President of the United States.” He promised to testify
against Flynn at Foreign Relations Committee hearings.20
Bridges cited four grounds for his opposition: first, that
Flynn had represented a New Yorker who had large “Jap”
interests in the United States before Pearl Harbor; second,
that Flynn as chancellor of New York City had invested and
lost more than a million dollars in public funds in a firm
that later employed him as general counsel; third, that he
had appointed the “noted criminal and murderer” Dutch
Schultz as an honorary deputy sheriff of Bronx County back
in the 1920s; and finally, that the grand jury investigation
of the use of city-owned material to pave Flynn’s Lake
Mahopac estate was “improperly handled.”21 As a symbol
of the fight he planned to wage, Bridges kept on his desk a
five-pound paving brick presented to him by a New York
delegation as a “tombstone” for Flynn’s career in public
life. The delegation told Bridges it hoped the brick would
serve as a warning to Australians “to nail down all public
property when Flynn arrives [there] . . . as a fugitive from
justice.”22
While the national media saw the Flynn story as good
fodder, few observers anticipated that the nomination
would do more than generate interesting headlines and
editorial commentary. Not since 1889 had the Senate
rejected a diplomatic appointment.23 All Flynn needed was
a solid phalanx of Democratic support in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and then in the up-or-down Senate
vote scheduled for the latter part of January. The Democratic
Senate leader, Alben Barkley, said he was confident Flynn’s
nomination would sail through after a lot of what he called
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“political noise.”24 Democratic senators, it seems, were
prepared to carry FDR’s water for him, meaning Flynn
would win.25 Back in Canberra the Australian government
anticipated Flynn’s easy confirmation, as did Nelson
Johnson, who continued carrying out his duties, but also
stepped up plans for his return to the United States and the
enrollment of his children in private schools in Washington.
But the Flynn issue had legs. Although Australians
remained anxious about a possible Japanese assault on the
homeland, with the Japanese air attacks on Allied positions
having for the moment ceased and the Japanese expelled
from Guadalcanal, “there was little possibility of Australia
being invaded, even had Japan the will to do so.”26 Hence
the Flynn nomination fight, ballyhooed by the media, was
not going to be crowded out by war news.
As a witness before the Democrat-dominated Foreign
Relations Committee, Flynn was prepared to deal with
the charges that Bridges had already announced he would
make. He confidently brushed them off, pointing out
that committees had investigated his official investments
and found no wrongdoing and that the appointment of
the gangster Dutch Schultz was under his real name—
Arthur Flegenheimer. In addition, he asserted that the
appointment was honorific only and was soon revoked. A
Democratic senator, seeking to be helpful to Flynn, argued
that the Schultz appointment was no more meaningful than
being named a Kentucky Colonel. The fact that Schultz/
Flegenheimer would be allowed to carry a concealed
weapon was not mentioned in any defense of Flynn’s
unusual dispensation of honorifics.27
Addressing the much-hyped paving blocks issue, Flynn
reminded senators that he had nothing to do with sending
Bronx workmen to his home. He was unaware, he said, that
work was being done until it was already completed; and
once he learned about it, he reimbursed the city for the
paving blocks. Flynn emphasized that two Bronx County
grand juries had accepted his explanations.28 For his part,
Committee Chairman Tom Connolly of Texas attacked
Bridges for implying that Flynn was somehow disloyal.
When Connolly said he had not “heard of any objections to
Mr. Flynn coming from Australia,” Bridges retorted, “No,
and you haven’t heard them shouting with glee about his
nomination, either. The Australian people probably feel that
they aren’t in a position to object to anything the President
does concerning them, because American soldiers are
defending their shores and they are getting lend-lease aid
from us. But that does not mean that they are happy about
having this war politician foisted on them.”29
The problem with Flynn’s explanations about the
paving blocks was not that he was necessarily lying or even
stretching the truth. There was no smoking gun proving
he ordered the paving blocks installed in his vacation
home driveway. Rather, the problem lay in the perception
that something was fishy in the arrangement. For most
Americans, it seemed obvious that even if Boss Ed Flynn
didn’t order anyone to do anything for him, underlings in
the Bronx Public Works Department did not need any explicit
go-ahead. They knew what Boss Flynn wanted, or they
thought they did, and they acted accordingly; that’s the
way the boss system worked. Flynn, in short, was damned
regardless of what he did or did not do. It did not help,
either, that at various points in the confirmation hearings,
Flynn claimed to have paid different sums for the labor
of the men who placed the blocks in his driveway—$80,
$88, and $750—while his law partner Monroe Goldwater
referred to a repayment of $450.30 The lack of consistency in
this testimony hurt his case.
Worse, Senator Bridges laid a trap for him on another,
more basic, matter: his qualifications for the Australian job.
Bridges began by peppering Flynn with questions about
his knowledge of Australia that the ambassador-designate
found frustrating and at times impossible to answer. How
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many states are there in Australia? Bridges asked. “Four
or five,” Flynn responded. Name them, said Bridges. Flynn
conceded he could not, adding that this was no different
than being unable to name the counties of England. Asked
to enumerate Australia’s current population, Flynn replied,
“approximately 10 million, I am told; I have never counted
them.” Bridges told him he was wrong on all counts and
continued asking questions. Flynn was able to name the
capital of Australia and when asked about parties, replied
that they were “Conservative and Labor, with Labor in
control.” Bridges was unmoved. “You do not know a great
deal about Australia,” he told Flynn. “I know enough,”
Flynn replied.31
At this point Bridges, who was not a member of the
Foreign Relations Committee, but rather its guest, had tested
the patience of several Democratic members. “Does the
senator want him to give the whole history of Australia?”
asked Senator James Tunnell of Delaware. Consequently,
Bridges began pursuing the other issues he had said he
would raise at the hearing. He elicited no new information
about Dutch Schultz or the state investments Flynn had
allegedly mishandled, but the damage was already done.
The hearings were devastating to the nomination. As
an observer quoted in the New York Herald Tribune put it,
anyone who followed them would not know if the United
States was “trying to export Mr. Flynn as a diplomat or
deport him as an undesirable.”32
Although the Foreign Relations Committee ultimately
advanced the nomination by a 13–10 margin, three
Democrats had voted against Flynn in committee, and
several others—doubtless reading their mail and the
newspapers—began expressing doubts. Publicly, the White
House remained committed to the nomination and Flynn
expressed confidence he would be confirmed.
But it was not to be. The critical wedge against the
nomination was driven by Ed Flynn’s old political enemy,
Ed Crump, the Democratic boss of Memphis, Tennessee.
Crump had long nursed a grudge against Flynn on several
counts. His preferred vice- presidential nominee in 1940,
Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky, had been nixed by
Flynn, a supporter of the more liberal Henry A. Wallace,
who got the nod. Further, Crump’s nominees for patronage
positions in the Tennessee Valley Authority were usually
ignored—a slight he blamed on Flynn, who may in fact
have had nothing to do with the matter. Whatever the
reality behind the Memphis boss’s grievances, Crump
passed the word to Tennessee’s senior Democratic senator,
Kenneth McKellar, that he wanted Flynn’s nomination to
fail. On January 28 McKellar announced he would oppose
the nomination. It was the tipping point in the confirmation
battle.33 Although the Washington press suggested that
Flynn might be confirmed with a margin of one or two
votes, the fight had gone out of the boss.
As opposition to Flynn built, Roosevelt said not a
word in public on behalf of his long-time associate. To an
experienced politician like Flynn this was a sign that he
needed to take the fall. And so he did. On February 1, Flynn
announced that while he was confident he would have
been confirmed in a full Senate vote, he was withdrawing
his nomination and would seek to return to his life in
politics. It was a stunning setback for the president. As Roy
Howard vividly put the matter in a private letter, the Flynn
nomination had “just exploded like a can of fermented
tomatoes.”34
Australians were delighted with the news, though at
this stage they still anticipated Johnson’s departure and
remained wary about whom FDR might nominate next.
Some observers suggested that the former U.S. minister to
New Zealand, Patrick Hurley—a close associate of General
MacArthur—was lobbying for the post. No one knew
what the president would do. Johnson, on tenterhooks,
went about his daily business as minister. For nearly two
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months the president kept his counsel on the subject of a
Henry A. Wallace on Roosevelt’s ticket by Senator Harry S.
new minister for Australia. Perhaps Roosevelt felt it would
Truman of Missouri.43 Perhaps as a way of making amends
be unseemly to have a second name at the ready so quickly;
for the embarrassment Flynn suffered in 1943, the president
perhaps he was preoccupied with more pressing matters
had Flynn invited to serve as a presidential aide at the Yalta
on the war front. During the period of watching and
Conference of 1945. But in the end he was probably better
waiting, Johnson’s friends, including Stanley Hornbeck in
known as a whipping boy for Republican politicians in New
Foggy Bottom, reminded Secretary of State Cordell Hull
York, including two-time presidential nominee Thomas E.
that the present incumbent wanted to remain on the job
Dewey.44 By 1947 Flynn, having dictated his memoirs but
and deserved to stay. Meanwhile, reporters—notably those
still active in politics, was increasingly incapacitated by
working for Scripps-Howard papers—were pressing Hull
heart trouble and related ailments. He died in August 1953
on Johnson’s status. Well aware of Johnson’s attributes, Hull
while on a visit to Ireland.45
was not unsympathetic.35 In the latter part of March, Hull
What were the implications of the battle that FDR lost?
was finally able to get Roosevelt’s attention and on March
At a minimum, it was an ill-thought-out appointment that
24 received the go-ahead to inform Johnson, by telegram,
inflamed Roosevelt’s opponents and gave them a stick
that he could continue in Canberra.36 The news reached
with which to attack the administration. It resulted in
the pages of both American and Australian newspapers
what Time called FDR’s “worst political defeat” since the
on March 25.37 “Hearty congratulations,” wrote Stanley
Supreme Court packing debacle of 1937.46 St. Louis PostHornbeck to his old friend. “It’s been nasty—but it ends
Dispatch editorial writer Irving Dilliard may have written
well.”38
the most perceptive account of the president’s stumble.
Australians expressed themselves satisfied with the
How was it, Dilliard asked, that the “power and influence”
outcome, among them former Prime
of the Roosevelt administration could
Minister Hughes and current Prime What were the implications of not get Flynn confirmed, when six
Minister Curtin. Curtin issued a the battle that FDR lost? At a months before, the administration had
statement: “I feel that I cannot exaggerate minimum, it was an ill-thought- no difficulty getting Jersey City Boss
the value of Johnson’s work in Australia. out appointment that inflamed Frank Hague’s man, Thomas F. Meaney,
This country is deeply indebted to him.” Roosevelt’s opponents and gave a lifetime appointment on the federal
In a handwritten note the day he learned them a stick with which to attack bench? The answer, he said, lay in the
of FDR’s decision to keep Johnson on, the administration. It resulted in November election results. Thanks to a
Curtin told Johnson that it was with what Time called FDR’s “worst Republican resurgence in the midterm
“deep pleasure” that he received the political defeat” since the Supreme elections that brought nine new GOP
announcement from Washington. “You
senators into office, a coalition of
Court packing debacle of 1937.
know that it would be presumptuous
Republicans and Southern Democrats
for me to hold opinions regarding the
was now able to stymie New Deal
appointments your country makes. But I can express my
proposals it disliked. “The Flynn debacle,” Dilliard wrote,
delight when they keep valued friends within my small
was the “number one manifestation” of the new clout of
orbit. And if, as I hope, the delight is mutual, then heaven
this coalition. FDR’s defeat on the Flynn nomination was,
be praised.”39 The delight was mutual. In responses that
Dilliard noted, a serious strike at New Dealers, if not the
New Deal itself.47
became formulaic in the telling, Johnson assured Curtin
and his other correspondents that he was “content” with
This was a sensible assessment. As historians have
the outcome and looked forward to staying on the job until
recently noted, by 1943 the New Deal was in effect blunted,
the war was won.40
first by the war, then by FDR’s loss of leverage in the wake of
Johnson’s friends’ reactions ranged from relieved to
the 1942 elections.48 The Flynn nomination was a symptom,
ecstatic. Former diplomat and Undersecretary of State
not a cause, of FDR’s declining domestic clout. That it
W.R. Castle told Johnson that the Flynn “business” was
caused the president only some temporary heartburn was
“so disgusting that it really shocked the whole country,
small solace to Ed Flynn. That the president made this
and it added to your popularity because, as you know,
nomination, and lost by it, was no one’s fault but his own.
we Americans always like the fellow who has been
Notes:
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